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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BOUNTIFUL CITY ) 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) Case No. 860278-CA 
vs. ) 
BARBARA MAREK, ) 
Defendant/Appella 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The above action was brought against Defendant on January 
31, 1986, for driving a motor vehicle with no Utah registration. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On April 18, 1986 Defendant was trie<b for the offense of 
driving a motor vehicle with no Utah registration. The trial 
Court took the matter under advisement, and a judgment of guilt 
and sentence was imposed on May 5, 1986. On October 31, 1986 the 
District Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court and 
remanded the case for sentencing. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the Circuit Courtfs ruling 
and the District Court's finding, as well as a denial of relief 
sought by Appellant. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The record indicates that on January 31, 1986, defendant was 
cited for driving a motor vehicle not registered in accordance 
with the laws of the State of Utah. A formal information 
charging the Defendant with NO UTAH REGISTRATION was filed on 
February 14, 1986. The trial was set for April 18, 1986 and the 
Defendant received notice of that date in court on February 24, 
1986. The Defendant made a demand for trial by jury on March 6, 
1986. That request was denied by the court. 
On April 18, 1986 trial was held in the Fourth Circuit 
Court, Bountiful Department. Bountiful City Police Officer Carl 
Krall was sworn and examined by the City Prosecutor. Defendant 
then had an opportunity to cross-examine the officer's testimony. 
The defendant was advised of her right to testify. The defense 
called Richard Marek to testify, and he refused to swear to tell 
the truth. The court refused to hear Mr. Marek's testimony 
without the oath. The defendant then called Officer Krall to 
testify, and then Mr. Marek agreed to affirm to tell the truth 
and he testified for the defense. 
The Court took the matter under advisement and rendered a 
guilty judgment on May 5, 1986. Defendant appealed to the Second 
Judicial District Court, County of Davis, and on October 31, 1986 
the District Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court and 
remanded the case to the trial court for sentencing. 
2 
SOMMARY OF ARGDMENT 
No deprivation of constitutional rights occurred where the 
appellant was found guilty of violating a valid city ordinance. 
Respondent Bountiful City has the right to legislate on the same 
subject as a state statute by an express grant of authority. 
There is no inconsistency that would invalidate the city ordin-
ance. The fact that the city ordinance prescribes a smaller 
penalty than the state statute on the same subject does not 
invalidate the municipal law. Rights of the accused to a 
trial by jury were not available for violation of an infraction 
which can not be punished by imprisonment. 
The constitutional argument regarding use of gold and silver 
coin as the only tender in payment of debt is without merit. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO RIGHT TO A JDRY TRIAL FOR VIOLATION OF 
AN INFRACTION WHICH IMPOSES NO INCARCERATION 
A defendant is not entitled to a jury trial for violation of 
a city ordinance which cannot be punished by incarceration. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-4-19, (1953, as amended) provides as 
follows: "All criminal actions before a circuit court arising 
under city ordinances shall be tried and determined without the 
intervention of a jury, except in cases where imprisonment may be 
made a part of the penalty." 
A person convicted of an infraction may not be imprison-
ed, but may be subject to a fine. Utah Code Ann. Section 
76-3-205, (1953 as amended). The rights of an accused to a jury 
trial are not violated where the offense is an infraction not 
punished by imprisonment. 
The Bountiful City Traffic Code Section 8-2-104(a) which 
charged the defendant with improper registration was an infrac-
tion. The only penalty for violation of that Bountiful City 
Ordinance was payment of a fine. The appellant was never subject 
to punishment by imprisonment. The right to a jury trial is not 
available to a defendant charged with violation of a city 
ordinance which does not provide for punishment by incarceration. 
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POINT II 
A MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE IS VALID WHERE THE PENALTY 
DOES NOT EXCEED THAT IMPOSED BY STATE LAW 
Municipalities have the authority to enact rules and 
regulations consistent with the Traffic Rules and Regulations 
Act. Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-16 (1953 as amended). Bountiful 
City Traffic Code Section 8-2-104(a) is consistent with Utah Code 
Ann. Section 41-1-18 regarding registration of vehicles. "In 
determining whether an ordinance is in ^conflict' with general 
laws, the test is whether the ordinance permits or licenses that 
which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa...." 
Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113,93 P2d 671f 673 (Utah 1938). 
Adequate legislative authority exists for Bountiful City's 
enactment of Section 8-2-104(a) of the Bountiful City Traffic 
Code. 
In the present case the Bountiful City ordinance does not 
permit action that the state statute prohibits. The municipal 
ordinance differs from the state regulation only in the area of 
penalties prescribed for failure to register a motor vehicle. 
The test for whether a municipal ordinance is repugnant to or in 
conflict with state law is not whether it provides different 
penalties for the same violation, but whether it permits some-
thing that the state statute forbids. The only restriction on 
municipal penalties that differ from st^te laws is that they 
cannot exceed that of state law. McQuillin, Municipal Corpora-
tions, Section 17.15, at page 326 (3rd ed. 1981). 
5 
The penalty in the Bountiful City ordinance is less than 
that imposed by the State. The city ordinance is an infraction 
with a fine as the only penalty, not to exceed five hundred 
dollars, the amount of fine for a class C misdemeanor. The state 
ordinance is a class B misdemeanor which imposes a fine of one 
thousand dollars or six months in jail. The court in Salt Lake 
City v. Allred, 437 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 1968) found nothing wrong 
with allowing a local government to punish conduct as a misde-
meanor which is a felony at the state level. Salt Lake City 
v. Allred, cited with approval 37 Am.Jur., Municipal Corpora-
tions, Section 165, p. 791, as follows: 
A municipal ordinance is not in conflict with a statute 
authorizing its adoption because of a difference in 
penalties. Thus, further and additional penalties may 
be imposed by statute, without creating inconsistency 
and conversely, at least in some instances lesser 
penalties may be imposed by the ordinance for violation 
than by the statute without conflict. 
Bountiful City had sufficient legislative authority to enact 
an ordinance regarding registration of motor vehicles and the 
penalty involved could be less restrictive than the state statute 
without being inconsistent. The city ordinance is valid when it 
relates to the same subject matter as the state statute and 
prescribes a smaller penalty. The information is not void 
because it charges the defendant with violation of a valid 
ordinance, lawfully enforceable by the city. 
Appellnt urges that due to the lesser penalty the city 
ordinance is invalid and violates the constitutional right to 
equal protection. As set forth in Allred 437 P.2d 434, the 
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Bountiful City ordinance which imposes a lesser penalty is 
lawfully enforceable by the city. Any assertion of constitu-
tional violations based on validity of th£ ordinance is without 
merit. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Bountiful City Ordinance regarding registration of motor 
vehicles is not in conflict with state statutes on the same 
subject. The city ordinance which prescribes a smaller penalty 
than state laws on the same subject matter is valid. No consti-
tutional violations of due process or equal protection occurred 
where all proceedings were based on a valid city ordinance. The 
Circuit Court's finding of guilt and the District Court's 
affirmation of that judgment should be upheld. 
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